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Constitutional Intelligence:  Restoring 
Politics in the War on Terror  
Roger Pilon  
We are invited in this symposium to draw lessons from 
Lincoln’s constitutionalism for today’s War on Terror—and on 
this panel to consider whether a wartime decline in civil liberties 
can be justified by a gain of civil rights.  As an initial matter, let 
me suggest that the distinction between civil liberties and civil 
rights is less than conspicuous.  Notwithstanding Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld’s efforts in the 1913 and 1917 Yale Law 
Journal to distinguish rights, powers, privileges, and 
immunities—all of which could be reduced to rights, he 
concluded—I have never been persuaded that a clear contrast 
between the two could be drawn, other than nominally.1 
Accordingly, I will take the basic questions before us to be: 
Do we at times give up a measure of liberty for a measure of 
security?  And should we?  Those questions take us to 
fundamental moral, political, and legal principles.  And the 
answers to both, I submit, are yes—at times we do and we should 
sacrifice a measure of liberty for a greater measure of security.  
Thus, Benjamin Franklin was as wrong when he said that those 
who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither,2 even if 
that is sometimes true, as when he said that “there never was a 
good war or a bad peace.”3  History, of course, is replete with 
peace agreements that have led only to future wars.4 
 
 This is a revised version of remarks delivered at a symposium on “Lincoln’s 
Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the War on Terror,” Chapman University 
School of Law, Jan. 30, 2009. 
 Vice President for Legal Affairs; Director, Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato 
Institute. The views expressed here are my own, not those of the Cato Institute. 
 1  WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed.) (photo. reprint 2002) (1946) (Originally 
in 1913 and 1917 Yale Law Journal). 
 2  HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA 289 (1812) (attributed to Jackson and 
Franklin but disowned by Franklin according to World Cat) (“Those who would give up 
essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”). 
 3  Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Sir Joseph Banks (July 27, 1783), in JARED 
SPARKS, THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 547 (1882). 
 4  See, e.g., 12 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 331 (15th ed. 2002) (discussing 
how the Treaty of Versailles led to an upsurge in German militarism, fostered deep 
resentment, and encouraged future German aggression). 
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I.  LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 
Abraham Lincoln understood those questions.  But if one 
takes some of the things he did during the Civil War out of 
context, it is easy to fault him, as many have.  Early in the war, 
for example, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus, a power the 
Constitution seems to reserve to Congress under limited 
circumstances,5 but look at the context. 
In brief, having participated in the election of 1860 and lost, 
all but four of the southern states that would soon form the 
Confederacy seceded from the Union and began seizing federal 
property in the South.6  After his inauguration in March of 1861, 
Lincoln was initially prepared to live with the situation.7  But 
when he sought to resupply Fort Sumter, a beleaguered island 
garrison in Charleston Bay that had remained in Union hands, 
Confederate forces began firing on the fort before the supply 
ships could arrive.8  Two days later the men at the fort 
surrendered.9  Northern reaction was intense.10  When Lincoln 
called up 75,000 volunteers, the four remaining southern states, 
including Virginia, joined the Confederacy.11 
Soon after, Lincoln’s focus shifted to Maryland when 
northern troops traveling to Washington by rail were attacked by 
a mob in Baltimore.12  With southern sympathies running high in 
Maryland, and Virginia now firmly in the Confederacy, Lincoln 
feared that the capital of the Union would soon be isolated, so he 
ordered the writ of habeas corpus suspended along any “military 
line” between Philadelphia and Washington.13  Notwithstanding 
the placement of the Suspension Clause in Article I, the 
Constitution is silent, of course, about who has the power to 
suspend the writ.14  More to the point here, however, Congress 
was not in session and would not again be in session until July 
 
 5  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 22–25, 36 (1998). 
 6  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 264, 267, 
271, 273 (1988) [hereinafter “MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM”]; JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 9 (2008) 
[hereinafter “MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR”]. 
 7  MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 262–64. 
 8  Id. at 264, 267, 271, 273. 
 9  Id. at 273–74. 
 10  Id. at 274–75. 
 11  See MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra note 6, at 22; MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF 
FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 280. 
 12  MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 285. 
 13  REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 20–25. 
 14  “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 2. 
Do Not Delete 10/15/2009 6:15 PM 
2009] Constitutional Intelligence 657 
4.15  When Congress finally did convene, it ratified a number of 
Lincoln’s wartime actions, but it would be another two years 
before it ratified this and Lincoln’s later, broader suspension of 
habeas corpus.16 
In the meantime, Chief Justice Roger Taney, sitting as a 
United States circuit judge for the District of Maryland, tried to 
thwart Lincoln’s habeas suspension;17 but Lincoln ignored 
Taney’s order to bring one John Merryman before the court, 
famously asking Congress, “[Are] all the laws, but one [i.e., 
habeas corpus], to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to 
pieces, lest that one be violated?”18  Three years later, Lincoln 
would reflect on his action with an analogy:  
Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution?  
By general law life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must 
be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a 
limb.  I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become 
lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the 
constitution through preservation of the nation.19 
Thus, Lincoln understood that the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact.20  Our Constitution, in particular, vests powers 
flexibly enough to protect both security and liberty, as the 
circumstances warrant.  But that becomes clear only if one is 
clear about the first principles of the matter, which is where I 
want now to turn. 
I will begin by briefly setting forth the general theory or 
framework.  Within that framework I will then look, again 
briefly, at one crucial element of the current War on Terror—the 
gathering of foreign intelligence—leaving other elements of the 
war to others on the panel.  As revealed by the New York Times 
on December 16, 2005,21 based on information leaked by a Justice 
Department official with a top secret Sensitive Compartmented 
 
 15  At that time in our history, Congress normally met in December of the year after 
the elections in even-numbered years.  But several states held their congressional 
elections only in the spring of odd-numbered years.  As a result, Congress could not meet 
in 1861 until all representatives had been elected.  See MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra 
note 6, at 23–24. 
 16  See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. 
 17  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Taney, C.J.). 
 18  Memorandum: Military Arrests, c. May 17, 1861, in WITH LINCOLN IN THE WHITE 
HOUSE: LETTERS, MEMORANDA, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JOHN G. NICOLAY, 1860–1865, 
430 (2000) (original emphasis); See also REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 38. 
 19  MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra note 6, at 30 (original emphasis). 
 20  Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1257, 1257 (2004). 
 21  James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
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Information clearance,22  President George W. Bush launched the 
“Terrorist Surveillance Program”23 shortly after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, briefing eight key members of 
Congress as he did so.  Although the program was and still is 
secret, in essence it was designed for gathering intelligence on 
suspected terrorists by monitoring the electronic communications 
of individuals outside the United States, even when those 
communications travel through or involve persons in the United 
States, and even when doing so would seem to violate the 
strictures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA),24 which purports to provide the administration the 
“exclusive” means for such monitoring.  Finally, I will argue that 
the administration’s various foreign intelligence-gathering 
activities have been and continue to be not only legal but also 
perfectly consistent with those background principles. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL BASICS: POWERS GRANTED, RIGHTS 
RETAINED 
Starting at the top, then, let me begin with the very function 
of a constitution: in the American context, certainly, our 
Constitution is the document through which “We the People of 
the United States” authorized, instituted, empowered, and 
limited the government we created through it.  That places us 
squarely in the individualist, state-of-nature tradition: the people 
come together in the original position to give the government its 
powers; the government does not give the people their rights—
they are born with those rights.  That is the theory of the 
Constitution’s Preamble.  Before that, it was the theory of the 
Declaration of Independence; and before that of John Locke, the 
philosophical father of the nation.25 
 
 22  Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40. 
 23  President Bush first used the term “Terrorist Surveillance Program” publicly in a 
Jan. 23, 2006 speech. See AP picks up White House's ‘terrorist surveillance program’ 
terminology, Media Matters for America, Feb. 9, 2006, available at 
http://mediamatters.org/items/200602090010 (last visited March 31, 2009).  Because the 
administration has modified its secret foreign intelligence gathering activities over time, I 
will speak generically of those activities rather than use the term “Terrorist Surveillance 
Program,” which seems to refer to the program that was in place from shortly after 9/11 
until sometime after it was revealed to the public in December of 2005. 
 24  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(1978) (amended 2008).  FISA has been amended several times, including by the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008, HR 6304, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008), signed 
into law on July 10, 2008; The Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 
552 (2007) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006)), signed into law on August 5, 2007; and 
the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), signed by President Bush 
on October 26, 2001. 
 25  See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIESES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1690) (discussing the origin and purpose of government). 
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Too often, however, both libertarians and civil libertarians 
focus only on the last of those constitutional functions—on the 
limits on power—and understandably so.  As Thomas Jefferson 
observed, and history has amply demonstrated, “the natural 
progress of things is for liberty to yield, and government to gain 
ground.”26 But limits on government power are only one side of 
the constitutional equation; grants of power are the other side, 
and an undue focus on limits slights that side.  The reason we 
create government in the first place, after all, is to better protect 
ourselves than we would be able to do, absent government, in the 
state of nature—where life, Thomas Hobbes reminded us, is 
“solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short.”27 
In a word, we came out of the state of nature for our own 
safety.28  There are thus two rights at issue here, both held 
against the government we created in the original position: the 
right to privacy; and the prior right to be secure in our “lives, 
liberties, and estates.”29  And no matter how finely one tries a 
priori to calibrate the relation between the two, in a world of risk 
and imperfect knowledge, there will be times a posteriori when 
the calculus must be overridden and liberty must yield to 
security.  All of which is to say that an undue obsession with 
overweening government can leave us exposed to the very threats 
we created government to protect us from in the first place, 
undermining the very purpose of government. 
That much is elementary, of course, yet to listen to much of 
the recent discourse one would think it had been utterly 
forgotten.  Thus, in the debate over the proper role of the 
National Security Agency (NSA) in gathering foreign intelligence, 
the critics’ obsession with privacy has all too often ignored the 
calculus entailed in the trade-off between privacy and security.  
On one hand, if the NSA intercepts your communications in an 
effort to detect terrorist threats, you will not even know it, much 
less be able to show an actionable harm.30  On the other hand, if 
intelligence gathering is restricted out of an excessive concern for 
privacy, the communications that precipitated 9/11 may very well 
 
 26  DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 (Univ. 
Press of Va. 1994). 
 27  THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996) (1651). 
 28  See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books, Inc. 
1974) (for a sophisticated discussion of the matter). 
 29  “And ’tis not without reason, that [man] seeks out, and is willing to joyn in 
Society with others who are already united, or have mind to unite for the mutual 
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, 
Property.”  LOCKE, supra note 25, § 123 at 350 (original emphasis). 
 30  In fact, it was for lack of standing that the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint 
in ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648, 653 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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go undetected.  The costs of erring on the side of security are 
miniscule; while on the side of privacy they can be catastrophic, 
as we have seen.  Intelligence is the first line of defense in the 
War on Terror.  Without timely and adequate intelligence we are 
defenseless, which is why this war cannot be fought using the 
reactive, law enforcement model.31 
III.  EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
But the Constitution hardly precludes that kind of cost-
benefit analysis.  Nor is it insensitive to where in the government 
the balance is best struck.  Through Article II, it vests 
responsibility for the security of the nation, and hence for making 
such calculations, primarily in the executive, whose power in such 
matters is checked in limited ways by Congress, and in still more 
limited ways by the judiciary, a pattern our history has 
repeatedly demonstrated.32 Thus, it is no accident that when 
Lincoln explained his actions to Congress he pointed to his oath 
of office, which required him to “preserve, protect, and defend” 
the Constitution, a duty that overrode any specific constitutional 
constraints.33  And he added that the attack on Fort Sumter left 
him with no choice “but to call out the war power of the 
Government; and so to resist force, employed for its destruction, 
by force, for its preservation.”34 
That distribution of powers is perfectly consistent with our 
theoretical foundations and our historical practices.  Thus, Locke, 
early on, speaks of the “Executive Power” as the power each of us 
has in the state of nature to secure his rights.35  That is the main 
power we yield up to government once we create it in the original 
position, charging government to exercise it on our behalf.  Later 
on, once powers are separated—for better protection against 
government—Locke speaks of the “Federative Power,” which the 
executive exercises over foreign affairs.36  And about that power 
he says, importantly, “it is much less capable to be directed by 
antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than [by] the Executive; and 
 
 31  See generally, ANDREW C. MCCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE 
JIHAD 51–58 (2008) (discussing the intelligence failures that have led to terrorist attacks 
in the United States and the shortcomings of the law enforcement model for fighting 
terrorism). 
 32  See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 1–9 (2005); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” 
Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1005, 1020–23 (2007). 
 33  See Pushaw, supra note 32, at 1030–31 n.108. 
 34  MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR, supra note 6, at 24. 
 35  LOCKE, supra note 25, § 13, at 275–76. 
 36  Id. § 147–48, at 365–66. 
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so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those 
whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick [sic] good.”37 
Likewise, Montesquieu, described by James Madison in 
Federalist 47 as “the oracle who is always consulted”38 concerning 
the separation of powers, writes of the Executive that he 
“establishes the public security, and provides against 
invasions.”39 
And not just the theorists but experience too, under the 
Articles of Confederation, had taught the Framers the folly of 
legislative dominance in foreign affairs.  Here, for example, is 
Madison at the Constitutional Convention: “Experience had 
proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the 
Legislative vortex.  The Executives of the States are in general 
little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent.”40 
Madison somewhat overstates the point, however.  To be 
sure, one of the main concerns at the Convention, and a principal 
reason for urging a new constitution, was the lack under the 
Articles of Confederation of a unified, forceful executive—
remember, the new nation was surrounded by three European 
powers all stronger than itself.41  But experience in the states 
was mixed.  As Professor John Yoo has shown, the constitutions 
of New York (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire 
(1784) provided for relatively strong and successful executives.42  
By contrast, Pennsylvania (1776), with its twelve-man executive 
council, and South Carolina (1776), where the executive was all 
but powerless absent express authority from the legislature, 
offered models the Convention could have chosen but did not.43 
Thus, it is no surprise that during the nation’s first year 
under the new Constitution we find Madison writing, “[T]he 
Executive power being in general terms vested in the President, 
all powers of an Executive nature, not particularly taken away 
must belong to that department.”44 And a year later, here is 
Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, writing in an April 24, 
1790 memorandum to President George Washington:  
 
 37  Id., § 147, at 366 (original emphasis). 
 38  THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). 
 39  BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 11 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent 
trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1949) (1748). 
 40  JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 312 
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966). 
 41  See YOO, supra note 32, at 68. 
 42  Id. at 67–68. 
 43  Id. at 63, 72–73. 
 44  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 405–06 n. 1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1904) 
(1904) (emphasis added). 
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The Constitution . . . has declared that ‘the Executive powers shall be 
vested in the President,’ submitting only special articles of it to a 
negative by the Senate . . . It belongs then to the head of that 
department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted 
to the Senate.45   
And then he adds: “Exceptions are to be construed strictly”46—a 
rare point of agreement between Jefferson and Alexander 
Hamilton. 
That balance, until very recently, has only been confirmed by 
the great preponderance of cases, which hold that the foreign 
affairs power belongs mainly to the executive, except as 
specifically reserved.  Reviewing recent scholarship that rejects 
that view, Professor H. Jefferson Powell, who served in the Office 
of Legal Counsel in the Clinton Justice Department, noted that 
the problem for those “adopting the congressional-primacy view 
is that one [must] repudiate or distinguish away most of what the 
Supreme Court appears to have said on the subject.”47  To be 
sure, the constitutional text is considerably more 
underdetermined in foreign than in domestic affairs.  But that 
means only that theory, structure, history, and precedent loom 
larger, and they all point to executive dominance in foreign 
affairs. 
IV.  THE GATHERING OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
Turning, then, to the matter at hand, how does this brief 
background shed light on the power to gather foreign 
intelligence?  I submit that the question here is not whether the 
Bush administration’s foreign intelligence surveillance activities 
amount to “warrantless wiretapping” in violation of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), for that would beg the 
separation-of-powers question by presuming congressional 
supremacy.  Rather, to avoid that circularity, the questions at the 
end of the day are whether FISA was wise and whether it is an 
unconstitutional intrusion on the vested Article II power of the 
president,48 and the two are closely connected. 
Consider, as a preliminary matter, whether it was wise.  Let 
us start with the facts, and the overriding fact is that we do not 
 
 45  Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic 
Appointments in 16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378–79 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961) 
(2000) (original emphasis). 
 46  Id. 
 47  H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign 
Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1999). 
 48  See Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 
88 B.U.L. REV. 375 (2008). 
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know many of the facts.  Foreign intelligence gathering is done in 
secret, understandably, and the issues are technical.  We are not 
talking here about agents putting on headphones and going down 
to the telephone company’s offices to clamp alligator clips on 
copper wires. 
The practical problem, however, is clear, and it was put well 
by Judge Richard Posner, writing in the Wall Street Journal 
shortly after the NSA surveillance story broke:  
The administration is right to point out that FISA, enacted in 1978—
long before the danger of global terrorism was recognized and 
electronic surveillance was transformed by the digital revolution—is 
dangerously obsolete.  It retains value as a framework for monitoring 
the communications of known terrorists, but it is hopeless as a 
framework for detecting terrorists.  It requires that surveillance be 
conducted pursuant to warrants based on probable cause to believe 
that the target of surveillance is a terrorist, when the desperate need 
is to find out who is a terrorist.49 
Posner likened that task to looking for a needle in a haystack.50 
But the technical problems surrounding FISA are more 
daunting still.  Professor K.A. Taipale, executive director of the 
Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, 
has summarized them as follows: 
In modern networks, data and increasingly voice communications are 
broken up into discrete packets that travel along independent routes 
between point of origin and destination where these fragments are 
then reassembled into the original whole message [“packet based”].  
Not only is there no longer a dedicated circuit, but individual packets 
from the same communication may take completely different paths to 
their destination.  To intercept these kinds of communications, filters 
[“packet-sniffers”] and search strategies are deployed at various 
communication nodes to scan and filter all passing traffic with the 
hope of finding and extracting those packets of interest and 
reassembling them into a coherent message.  Even targeting a specific 
message from a known sender requires intercepting (i.e., scanning 
and filtering) the entire communication flow.  Were FISA to be applied 
strictly according to its terms prior to any “electronic surveillance” of 
foreign communication flows passing through the US or where there 
is a substantial likelihood of intercepting US persons, then no 
automated monitoring of any kind could occur.51 
 
 49  Richard Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL STREET J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16 
(emphasis added). 
 50  Id. 
 51  K.A. Taipale, Whispering Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SEC., NO. 7, SUPL. BULL. ON L. & 
SEC., Spring 2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889120.  See also K.A. Taipale, 
The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 
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V.  THE STATUTORY ARGUMENTS 
Turning now to the legal questions, after the New York 
Times revealed the secret terrorist surveillance program on 
December 16, 2005,52 there was an immediate outcry among 
many civil libertarians.53  The administration responded six days 
later with a Department of Justice letter to the majority and 
ranking members of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees,54 defending the president’s actions on statutory, 
constitutional, and practical grounds. 
The administration’s statutory argument rests on the 
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF),55 which Congress 
passed only one week after 9/11.56  Section 2(a) of the Act 
authorizes the president:  
[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons.57   
At a minimum, that authorization would seem to entail the 
power to obtain the foreign intelligence necessary for 
accomplishing the authorization’s purpose—preventing any 
future terrorist attacks on America. 
The critics answered with narrow legal arguments, oblivious 
it seems to the pressing practical problems the administration 
faced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, to say nothing of 
possible political remedies for the critics’ concerns.  Thus, their 
main charge was that the AUMF could not be read as implicitly 
overriding FISA’s prohibition on warrantless domestic wartime 
surveillance because Congress in FISA expressly and specifically 
 
128, 135–36 (2007) (noting, like Posner, that FISA “provides no mechanisms for 
authorizing advanced technical methods” to identify terrorists).  
 52  Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 21. 
 53  See, e.g., Letter from 14 self-described scholars of constitutional law and former 
government officials “concerned by the Bush administration’s National Security Agency 
domestic spying program” to Members of Congress (Jan. 9, 2006) available at 
http://www.nsawatch.org/DOJ.Response.AUMF.final.pdf [hereinafter “Letter to Members 
of Congress”]; David Cole, et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 THE N.Y. REV. 
OF BOOKS 42, (Nov. 2, 2006).  On its editorial page, of course, the New York Times itself 
has kept up what often has seemed like a daily drumbeat of criticism of this and other 
elements of the War on Terror. 
 54  Letter from William E. Moschella to Chairmen Roberts and Hoekstra, Vice 
Chairman Rockefeller, and Ranking Member Harman (December 22, 2005) available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/pdf/12%2022%2005%20NSA%20letter.pdf. 
 55  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
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addressed that issue and limited that surveillance to the first 15 
days of war.58  In short, even though FISA excepts surveillance 
authorized by statute, and the AUMF was later in time, an 
unstated general “implication” overriding the specific and express 
language of FISA cannot reasonably be drawn, critics argued, for 
the law disfavors repeals by implication.59 
That is generally true, of course, and were Congress to have 
drafted the AUMF in the fullness of time—something it rarely 
does under the best of circumstances—it would be a more 
compelling argument.  But in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington on 9/11—recall, the AUMF was 
passed seven days later—Washington, even when business was 
able to resume, was an armed camp, with military personnel and 
equipment on every corner.  The AUMF uses few words.  A 
natural reading of its “general” implications aside, one can only 
assume that legislators did not consider every implication or 
every related statute, as they might have (but only might) under 
more normal circumstances.60 
But if one wishes, later in time, to focus on and argue from 
narrow points of statutory interpretation, the place to begin is 
with a thorough and detailed rebuttal of the critics, published by 
the Federalist Society.61  There the authors note, among much 
else, “several reasons for concluding that one need not invalidate 
FISA in order to uphold the NSA program.”62  Parsing carefully 
the statutorily defined species of “electronic surveillance” that 
comes within FISA’s ambit, “the range of conversations 
implicated in this controversy,” they conclude, “may be much 
narrower than commonly supposed.”63 
This is not the forum for close discussion of the statutory 
arguments, save for an additional practical consideration.  The 
administration’s critics have invariably assumed that a fairly 
sharp line could be drawn between foreign and domestic 
communications, or persons, or interceptions, when in fact that 
line is often unknown and unworkable and, worst of all, would 
seem to require ending the interception once it “crossed our 
 
 58  Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 3–4. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Still, the critics note correctly that insofar as the administration relies on a 
statutory argument, it had an opportunity to obtain authorization for warrantless 
surveillance when it sought and obtained amendments to FISA through the USA Patriot 
Act in October 2001.  Id. at n. 5. 
 61  See Andrew C. McCarthy, David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, NSA’s 
Warrantless Surveillance Program, Legal, Constitutional, and Necessary (May 22, 2007), 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070522_terroristsurveillance.pdf. 
 62  Id. at 54–60. 
 63  Id. at 55. 
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border”—precisely when we might most want to follow it.64  
Among the absurd results that have flowed from that focus is a 
recent secret decision by a FISA judge that the statute prohibited 
the warrantless interception of communications between 
individuals located outside the United States if the 
communications passed through an Internet switch located in the 
United States.65  After the decision came to light, the 
administration pressed Congress strongly and obtained a 
temporary fix in the form of the Protect America Act of 2007.66 
VI.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
But the main weakness of the critic’s statutory argument is 
circularity: it begs the basic question.  In the name of 
“constitutional avoidance” it simply assumes that Congress has 
the power to regulate the president’s Article II power to gather 
foreign intelligence, a power presidents have exercised since the 
nation’s founding, in war and peace alike, quite without any 
statutory micromanagement, and with consistent judicial 
deference.67  Notwithstanding that history, critics maintain that 
congressional regulation of the executive’s domestic electronic 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is constitutional, 
pointing in part to the Fourth Amendment: Congress may 
regulate the president’s conduct, they say, to ensure that the 
 
 64  Greg Miller, Court Puts Limits on Surveillance Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, 
at A16.  Those who point to FISA’s emergency provisions invariably ignore what they 
actually entail.  As the administration has put it: “There is a serious misconception about 
so-called ‘emergency authorizations’ under FISA, which allow 72 hours of surveillance 
without a court order.”  In particular, the attorney general must determine in advance 
that the FISA application will be approved.  Moreover, among other things, “a typical 
FISA application involves a substantial process in its own right: The work of several 
lawyers; the preparation of a legal brief and supporting declarations; the approval of a 
Cabinet-level officer; a certification from the National Security Advisor, the Director of 
the FBI, or another designated Senate-confirmed officer; and, finally the approval of an 
Article III judge.”  See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice on The NSA Program 
to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks: Myth v. Reality (Jan. 27, 2006) available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf.  Critics often complain that 
the FISA Court is a “rubber stamp.”  See Del Quentin Wilber, Surveillance Court Quietly 
Moving, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2009, at A2.  In 2007, the last year for which statistics are 
available, the court approved all but three of 2,370 applications while making substantive 
modifications to 86 others.  Id.  But that complaint ignores the applications that were 
never brought for fear of disapproval. 
 65  See Miller, supra note 64. 
 66  See The Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 24. 
 67  See A Tragic Legacy of Serious Harm to the Constitution and American Security 
Resulting from Legislative Usurpation of Executive Power:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 110th Congress 27–31 (2008) (statement of Robert F. Turner, Cofounder, 
Center for National Security Law) [hereinafter “Turner, Tragic Legacy”] available at 
http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/Turner-War-Powers-in-21stCentury-April08.pdf. 
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amendment’s warrant and probable cause “requirements” are 
met.68  To the administration’s response that the NSA 
surveillance at issue, undertaken mainly for national security 
rather than for law enforcement purposes, falls under the 
“special needs” exception to such requirements, critics answer 
that “‘special needs’ generally excuse the warrant and 
individualized suspicion requirements only where those 
requirements are impracticable and the intrusion on privacy is 
minimal.”69 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only “unreasonable” 
searches, of course, not warrantless searches.70  But to the critics’ 
points: Is satisfying those warrant and individualized suspicion 
“requirements” impracticable?  That is a judgment call that none 
but those conversant with the classified facts and practices can 
make.71  To be sure, officials charged with detecting terrorist 
activity have an interest in minimizing the difficulties of doing 
so.  But the assurances of the critics, most with no personal 
acquaintance with the matter, that “the experience of FISA 
shows that foreign intelligence surveillance can be carried out 
through warrants based on individualized suspicion”72 does not 
give confidence.73  And is the NSA’s intrusion on privacy more 
than minimal?  The critics’ assertion that “[w]iretapping is not a 
minimal intrusion on privacy”74 would be more convincing if, as 
noted earlier, they could produce people who even knew that 
their communications had been intercepted, much less could 
show that they had been harmed.  Here again, the contrast 
between the respective harms is stark—and surely must play 
into the meaning of “unreasonable.” 
In fact, the issue of a “special needs” exception was 
addressed very recently by the United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in only its second 
opinion, In re: Directives,75 decided on August 22, 2008, but made 
 
 68  Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 8. 
 69  Id. 
 70  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
 71  See infra notes 109–111 and the accompanying text. 
 72  Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 8. 
 73  See supra notes 49, 51, 61 and the accompanying text.  Indeed, if the In re Sealed 
Case, discussed infra, brought anything to light, it is how difficult and confusing it can be 
for intelligence officials and courts alike to discern and apply FISA’s provisions.  In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). 
 74  Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 8. 
 75  In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).  
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public only on January 16, 2009.  Ruling under provisions of the 
then-recently-expired Protect America Act of 2007, which had 
temporarily revised FISA,76 the court held that “a foreign 
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain 
foreign intelligence for national security purposes and is directed 
against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States.”77  Moreover, 
after considering the totality of the circumstances and balancing 
the relevant interests, the court also held “that the surveillances 
at issue satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement.”78 
B. The Separation of Powers 
Congressional regulation pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment is only one branch of the constitutional argument, of 
course.  More fundamental, arguably, is the separation-of-powers 
issue.  And here, it should be noticed, the critics’ push for 
congressional dominance in foreign affairs is but part of a much 
larger trend, stretching back over more than a century.  Today’s 
congressional supremacists see a broad scope for legislation in 
foreign affairs, which means, ultimately, for adjudication by the 
courts—in short, for the judicialization of war, promoted today 
largely by the international law branch of the legal academy.79  
But that development did not begin with foreign affairs.  Its roots 
are in the Progressive Era, with an emphasis on the statutory 
ordering of domains the Constitution had left largely to private 
ordering, albeit with judicial oversight under the common law.80  
That Progressive vision was finally constitutionalized by the New 
Deal Court, which is seen by many today, erroneously, as having 
checked the “activism” of the “Old Court.”81  In truth, however, 
the New Deal Court opened the floodgates for a surfeit of 
Progressive legislation—federal, state, and local—regulating vast 
areas of life, following which the courts were increasingly called 
 
 76  See The Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 24. 
 77  In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012. 
 78  Id. at 1016. 
 79  See David D. Cole, Rights over Borders:  Transnational Constitutionalism and 
Guantanamo Bay, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 51, 60; cf. Eric A. Posner, 
Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 23, 44–6.  For a critique of the move from traditional liberal internationalism to 
progressive transnationalism, see John Fonte, The World Is My Constituency, NATIONAL 
REVIEW, Nov. 2, 2008 available at http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
publication_details&id=5852. 
 80  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 2–8 
(2006). 
 81  Id. at 71–77. 
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upon to adjudicate the often inconsistent and incoherent 
legislative tangle that poured through.82 
With the Vietnam War, however, we saw that same 
Progressive impulse directed to foreign affairs.  Between 1964 
and 1984, for example, the congressional publication Legislation 
on Foreign Relations increased four-fold, from one 659-page 
volume to two volumes of over 1,300 pages each.83  It was a 
massive expansion of congressional micromanagement of the 
executive’s conduct of foreign affairs, no better illustrated than 
by the War Powers Resolution (1973) and FISA (1978).84 
Not surprisingly, those who argue for congressional 
supremacy in foreign affairs usually ignore the early sources 
cited above.  Instead, they take as their template the 1952 
concurrence of Justice Robert Jackson in the Youngstown case,85 
which in their hands has achieved all but iconic status.  Recall 
that Jackson distinguished three scenarios: the president’s power 
is at its height when supported by congressional action, he said; 
in a “zone of twilight” when Congress is silent; and “at its lowest 
ebb” when at odds with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.86 
 
 82  I have discussed those issues more fully in Guns and Butter: Setting Priorities in 
Federal Spending in the Context of Natural Disasters, Deficits, and War: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Subcomm. on Fed. Financial 
Management, Government Information, and International Security, United States S., 
109th Cong. (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice President for Legal Affairs, B. Kenneth 
Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies, and Director, Center for Constitutional Studies, 
Cato Institute), available at http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-rp102005.html, reprinted as 
The United States Constitution: From Limited Government to Leviathan, A.I.E.R. 
ECONOMIC EDUCATION BULLETIN, 2005. 
 83  COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1964 (1964); COMM. 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1984 (1984). 
 84  See Turner, Tragic Legacy, supra note 67. 
In the aftermath of the 1960s, congressional intrusion into matters the Constitution left 
mainly to politics was not limited to foreign affairs, of course. Another area that has seen 
congressional micromanagement, with predictable consequences, is campaign finance.  
See, e.g. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3; Federal 
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443. 88 Stat. 1263; 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81.  At oral argument in a case now before the Supreme Court, Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, former solicitor general Theodore B. Olson, arguing for the 
petitioner, described the current law as “one of the most complicated, expensive, and 
incomprehensible regulatory regimes ever invented by the administrative state”—a 
regime that Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart, arguing for the government, later 
admitted would allow for the regulation not only of the movie at issue but of books as well.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 37, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
No. 08-205, March 24, 2009, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf. 
 85  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 86  Id. at 637. 
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There are several problems with using that template as a 
substitute for the Constitution as originally understood and as 
interpreted and applied by the courts over the years to foreign 
affairs.  First, Youngstown was arguably a domestic, not a foreign 
affairs, case, notwithstanding President Truman’s effort to 
bootstrap a local labor dispute into a foreign affairs matter.  
Second, Jackson’s concurrence was the opinion of only one 
justice.87  Third, it was dicta.  Fourth, it was metaphor.  Fifth, 
even on its own terms the passage did not say that the president 
did not have power; it said only that his power was “at its lowest 
ebb,”88 which is a political, not a legal, point.  Finally, Jackson 
carefully distinguished the seizure of private property within the 
United States from a case involving external affairs, noting 
expressly that the president’s “conduct of foreign affairs” was 
“largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,” by the other 
branches.89  And he added: “I should indulge the widest latitude 
of interpretation to sustain [the president’s] exclusive function to 
command the instruments of national force, at least when turned 
against the outside world for the security of our society.”90 
Administration critics also cite the so-called Keith case of 
1972.91  But that too was a domestic case.  And the Court there 
repeatedly distinguished it from one involving the president’s 
constitutional power to collect foreign intelligence.92  Writing for 
an unanimous Court, Justice Lewis Powell quoted from the 
wiretap provisions of the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act:93 
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit 
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he 
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential 
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign 
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United 
States, or to protect national security information against foreign 
intelligence activities.94 
But, critics respond, “FISA specifically repealed that 
provision, FISA § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1797, and replaced it with 
language dictating that FISA and the criminal code are the 
 
 87  Id. at 642. 
 88  Id. at 637. 
 89  Id. at 642. 
 90  Id. at 645 (emphasis added). 
 91  United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 303. 
 94  Id. 
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‘exclusive means’ of conducting electronic surveillance.”95  
Clearly, Congress can repeal that provision.  Consistent with the 
separation of powers, however, it cannot, by mere statute, repeal 
or otherwise restrict “the constitutional power of the President”—
a power it had recently recognized—by “dictating” how the 
president shall exercise his constitutional power. 
To be sure, Article I, section 8 of the Constitution vests 
power in Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution” the powers vested in the 
government, including the power of the president to gather 
foreign intelligence.96  But FISA is hardly “necessary” for 
carrying that power into execution—presidents have exercised it 
since the nation’s inception, quite without any congressional 
micromanagement.  Nor is FISA “proper” insofar as its 
restrictions intrude on the president’s vested foreign affairs 
powers or hinder his protection of the nation for so little gain—
both of which, unfortunately, are the case. 
Those conclusions emerged in various ways in the most 
authoritative opinion to date on FISA, post 9/11 and post Patriot 
Act, the In re: Sealed Case,97 decided on November 18, 2002, by 
the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review—its first decision since FISA was enacted.98  Although 
the government was not bringing an Article II challenge to FISA, 
it was seeking reversal of the lower FISA court’s grant of a 
surveillance order that imposed restrictions on the internal 
workings of the Justice Department, restrictions that arose, the 
court of review found, from several erroneous readings of the 
statute by prior courts.99  But in the course of its exhaustive 
opinion, the court of review spoke directly to the issue of inherent 
(more properly, vested100) executive power.101  Citing an earlier 
Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Truong,102 which dealt 
with pre-FISA surveillance based on “the President’s 
constitutional responsibility to conduct the foreign affairs of the 
United States,”103 the court said:  
The Truong court, as did all the other courts to have decided the issue, 
held that the President did have inherent authority to conduct 
 
 95  Letter to Members of Congress, supra note 53, at 6 (original emphasis). 
 96  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 97  In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curium). 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  See Lawson, supra note 48. 
 101  In re: Sealed Case was also cited repeatedly in the second opinion of the FISA 
Court of Review, In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2009).  
 102  United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d. 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 103  In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742. 
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warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . We 
take for granted that the President does have that authority and, 
assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the President’s 
constitutional power.104 
That does not settle the separation-of-powers question, of 
course, for it leaves open the relation, in various factual 
situations, between the president’s and Congress’s concurrent 
powers.  But it points in the right direction by noting the 
unmistakable history of judicial support for the president’s 
“inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain 
foreign intelligence information.”105  In deciding the issue before 
it, however, the Sealed Case court’s main concern was with how 
there arose a “false dichotomy” between surveillance for foreign 
intelligence purposes and surveillance for law enforcement 
purposes—leading to the “primary purpose” test for admitting 
evidence into criminal prosecutions—and how that led in turn to 
a “wall” between law enforcement and counterintelligence agents 
and agencies.106  In painstaking detail the court traces those 
errors.107  Yet the inescapable conclusion that emerges from that 
troubled history is really quite simple: How could it have been 
otherwise? 
VII.  CONGRESSIONAL OVERREACHING AND POLITICS 
The complex layers of confusion the Sealed Case court lays 
bare—among prior courts and government officials alike—is the 
product, quite simply, of repeated efforts by Congress to “get it 
right.”  But in a matter so fraught with infinite variety as foreign 
intelligence gathering, in a world of ever changing technology, 
statutory micromanagement of the kind revealed in Sealed Case 
is a fool’s errand.  Classical economists like F.A.  Hayek have 
demonstrated the folly of legislative efforts to manage the 
economy—the kinds of efforts that emerged from Congress with 
the New Deal.108  Mutatis mutandis, the same principles apply 
here.  All of which brings us back, not surprisingly, to John 
Locke: the foreign affairs power “is much less capable to be 
directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than [by] the 
Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and 
Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the 
publick [sic] good.”109 
 
 104  Id. (emphasis added). 
 105  Id. 
 106  See Id. 
 107  See Id. 
 108  See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. J., 519 (Sept. 
1945). 
 109  Locke, supra note 25. 
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And recent experience bears that out.  Recall the Senate 
testimony of former FBI agent Coleen Rowley, based in the FBI’s 
Minneapolis office, about the difficulties she encountered with 
FBI headquarters agents who feared she did not have enough 
evidence to obtain a FISA warrant to search the laptop of 
Zacarias Moussaoui, later convicted as the twentieth 9/11 
hijacker.110  And at Moussaoui’s trial, four years later, Rowley’s 
former colleague, FBI agent Harry Samit, testified that only days 
before 9/11 he tried to get a FISA warrant to search Moussaoui’s 
laptop, only to be told that he didn’t have enough to satisfy the 
FISA restrictions.111  When FISA was enacted, Congress decided 
to err on the side of privacy, not security, and we paid the price 
for it. 
None of this is to say, of course, that Congress is powerless 
in these matters.  In foreign affairs in general it has certain 
enumerated constitutional powers that historically have checked 
the executive in limited ways.  Most prominently, it has the 
power of the purse—and, ultimately, the power of impeachment.  
But short of those, it has the political power that is inherent in 
its oversight functions, whether conducted in public or, as is 
often necessary in these matters, in closed sessions.  When 
Congress tries to micromanage the executive through legislation, 
however, it is the courts that often end up doing the 
micromanaging, indulging the judicial hermeneutics we see in so 
many of these cases, trying to discern what Congress “really” 
meant, issuing fractured opinions and inscrutable guidance over 
matters beyond their competence.  The In re: Sealed Case 
illustrates the struggle: it shows, beyond doubt, how earlier 
courts, doing the same, led to the erection of the “wall” that may 
have led, tragically, to the terrorist attacks of September 11.112 
 
 110  Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/ 
testimony.cfm?id=279&wit_id=628 (statement of Coleen Rowley, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation agent). 
 111  Transcript of Record at 907–51, United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220 (2007), 
available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/moussaoui/zmsamit.html 
(last visited July 16, 2009). 
 112  See In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, n.29 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curium):  
An FBI agent recently testified that efforts to conduct a criminal investigation 
of two of the alleged hijackers were blocked by senior FBI officials—
understandably concerned about prior FISA court criticisms—who interpreted 
that court’s decisions as precluding a criminal investigator’s role.  One agent, 
frustrated at encountering the “wall,” wrote to headquarters: “[S]omeday 
someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we 
were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 
‘problems.’  Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their 
decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, [Usama Bin 
Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’”  The agent was told in response that 
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In the end, as the Framers understood, foreign affairs, with 
all its variables and subtleties, is more a matter for politics than 
law.  Early on, in secret sessions, President Bush briefed eight 
key members of Congress about the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program, to the apparent satisfaction of all.  It was only after 
details of the program were leaked to the press, more than three 
years later, that opinions shifted.  Still, as politics have played 
out since then, opinion has shifted again as cooler heads have 
come to the fore.  On July 10, 2008, President Bush signed The 
FISA Amendments Law of 2008, which members of Congress, 
including then Senator Barack Obama, supported 
overwhelmingly.113  Whether those amendments, which 
substantially loosen FISA’s restrictions on the president’s foreign 
intelligence surveillance power, will survive the test of time in an 
ever-changing world remains to be seen.  But a history of 
repeated revisions suggests that the Framers got it right when 
they left such matters mainly to the president and politics. 
 
headquarters was frustrated with the issue, but that those were the rules, and 
the National Security Law Unit does not make them up.  The Malaysia 
Hijacking and September 11th: Joint Hearing Before the Senate and House 
Select Intelligence Committees (Sept. 20, 2002) (written statement of New York 
special agent of the FBI). 
 113  H.R. 6304: FISA Amendments Act of 2008, available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-6304; See Michael Hayden, 
Warrantless Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A21: 
Some critics claim that Congress was not aware of the full extent of the 
program, but the ultimate judgment on the effectiveness of much of the 
program may actually have been the actions of Congress. In the 2008 
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress judged it 
appropriate not only to provide additional legal underpinnings for much of 
what the agency had been doing but also to recognize the value of its activities 
by providing additional critically needed capabilities. In my briefings to 
Congressional overseers from 2001 to 2005, I continually made the point that 
we simply could not achieve the program’s operational effect under FISA 
procedures as they then existed and it is clear that Congress ultimately agreed. 
